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Basic Iowa Civil Rights Act
Coverage, Procedure and Remedies

Contents

• Thumbnail Sketch of Iowa's Law
• Filing requirements
• Limitation Periods
• Cross filing
• Coverage - Employment
• Coverage - Housing
• Coverage - Public Accomodation
• Right to Sue
• Affirmative Relief, Damages and Chaser'due south Fees
• Jury Trial

Thumbnail Sketch

Y'all can get a thumbnail of Iowa'south coverage by looking at the "areas" and "bases" that are covered:

Area

This describes an area of activity or services in which discrimination is prohibited. For instance, if a complaint is brought alleging race discrimination in an employment practice we say that this falls within the "area" of employment. The five areas covered by the Iowa Act are employment, housing, public accommodations, pedagogy, and credit.

Basis

A personal characteristic which is protected from some forms of discrimination is a "basis". Again if a complaint of employment bigotry is brought alleging that race was the reason for the complainant being terminated and then the charge is said be exist on the "basis" of race. The protected bases of discrimination tin can vary co-ordinate the expanse alleged. The protected bases of discrimination in Iowa law are age [simply for employment and credit], sexual practice, race, colour, creed, national origin, faith, and disability. Also familial status, the presence of children in the household, is protected in the areas of credit and housing. Marital status is protected in the area of credit. To apply the fact that someone opposed a discriminatory do or that they filed a complaint as a reason to discriminate is discrimination on the ground of "retaliation".

Filing Requirements

Anyone seeking to criminate discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Deed must first file a complaint of discrimination with the Committee. Iowa Code sec. 216.16(i). The Iowa Civil Rights Act pre-empts other causes of activity and thus if you lot intend to sue on a case which requires proof of discrimination as one of its elements you must file a accuse with the Committee. E.yard. Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Iowa 1993).

The committee rules specify the requirements for a complaint'southward form. Basically it must be in writing, set forth identifying information for the parties, and generally describe the actions complained of. Technical defects tin can exist cured subsequently filing under rule 161 IAC 3.4(3). Under that dominion amendments to cure technical defects relate back to the original filing of the accuse. The Iowa Supreme Courtroom has recognized that there must be a good bargain of flexibility in what constitutes a sufficient charge considering they are ofttimes drafted up by the citizens without the aid of an attorney. Atomic number 26 Workers v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758 (Iowa 1971). Although the complaint must be "verified", Iowa Code sec. 21615(1), verification can occur without a notary if the complainant certifies "under penalty of perjury and pursuant to the laws of the State of Iowa and of the United states that the preceeding is truthful and correct." Iowa Code sec. 622.i

Filing tin can occur by diverse methods which are described in rule iii.5. These include by mail, by FAX, by delivery service, and in person. Under rule 3.five(10) the appointment of filing of a complaint is ever the date of receipt.

The applicable statutory provision are Iowa Code sec.'s 216.5(ii)(power to process charges); 216.fifteen(1) (describing filing briefly).

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Limitation Menses

A complaint alleging discrimination must be received past the Committee within 180 days later on the latest incident of alleged discrimination. 161 IAC three.5(10)(filed upon receipt); Iowa Code sec. 21615(12)(180 days). Unless proven to be in error the appointment a complaint is filed shall in no event be deemed to exist afterward than the date shown on the dated Committee receipt stamp. 161 IAC 3.5(10)(c) Of form, in federal employment cases under Championship Seven the fourth dimension limit is 300 days but merely if filing is fabricated first with the Committee (or the EEOC holds the case in "suspended animation"). Thus even if your employment case is between 180 and 300 days it is nevertheless easiest to file with ICRC fifty-fifty though yous are outside the state fourth dimension limit. You can, however, file directly with the EEOC and you lot volition all the same get the 300 day limit one time EEOC cross files with the Iowa Commission.

This filing menstruum is not jurisdictional and is field of study to waiver, estoppel and may be tolled for equitable reason. 161 IAC 3.3; Annear v. Country, 419 N.West.2nd 377, 379-fourscore (Iowa 1988). In a tolling situation the "question so becomes when would [a plaintiff] equally an boilerplate layman perceive that discrimination was occuring. The 180 day flow runs from that date." Annear, 419 North.W.2d at 380. Note that although Annear uses the phrase "continuing violation" this is a misnomer - the example is clearly 1 involving equitable tolling.

A "continuing violation" may be challenged even though only some of the events in the violation fall within the filing period. 161 IAC three.three. For case, in a harassment instance only the latest incident of harassment needs to be inside the filing catamenia, Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 North.Due west.2d 827, 832 (Iowa 1990) or if there are a serial of failures to promote this more often than not is viewed as a continuing violation and just the most recent failure to promote needs to timely. Annear v. Country, 419 N.W.2d 377, 379-eighty (Iowa 1988); Hy Vee v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 453 N.Westward.2d 512, 528 (Iowa 1990). As well if the respondent maintains a discriminatory policy and so that policy can exist challenged and damages tin can be obtained even if the only impairment causing events which upshot from the policy took place more than than 180 days earlier the filing of the charge. Hy Vee v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 453 Due north.Westward.2d 512, 529-30 (Iowa 1990). The Hy Vee instance has useful and extended discussions of both forms of standing violation since both were in issue in that case.

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Cross Filing

The Commission has a work sharing agreement with the EEOC and HUD. The Commission has no cross-filing agreement with local Iowa Commissions. No local committee is, at this time, a designated referral or deferral bureau for the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. Every bit a practical matter this means:

• EEOC - If you file with the ICRC the Commission will cantankerous file with EEOC. Even if the charge is outside Iowa's 180 day limitation flow the Commission is able to cross file with EEOC. In fact, in such a state of affairs it is necessary to file with the Iowa Commission before you lot can avail yourself of the longer federal statute of limitation. Although Title Seven gives the Commission a 60 day exclusive processing right the Commission's workshare understanding provides that in certain cases the Committee automatically waives exclusive processing. One class of cases where exclusive processing is waived is when the accuse is received outside the 180 day filing catamenia. If you file a belatedly charge with the Commission the exclusive processing is automatically waived and no further action need be taken by ICRC in order to waive exclusive processing. Come across Worthington 5. Union Pacific Railroad, 948 F.2d 477, 57 FEP 382 (8th Cir. 1991) (Waiver of 706 agency's sixty twenty-four hour period exclusive processing contained in worksharing agreement was self executing. The agency was non required to transport a notice of waiver of processing. Filing with country 706 agency with such a waiver in the worksharing agreement constituted filing with the EEOC.) Also nether the workshare agreement the Commission is appointed an agent for the EEOC for the receipt of charges. Thus technically as soon equally the ICRC receives a complaint which seeks to exist cross-filed the case is filed with the EEOC.
• HUD - File with the ICRC and the Commission will cross file with HUD.
• Locals - Equally a thing of courtesy and efficiency local commissions routinely forward charges filed with them to the Iowa Ceremonious Rights Committee. Since there are no official local referral agencies for the Iowa Commission such charges are deemed filed with the Commission when they are received by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and not before. Thus if you lot are close to the fourth dimension period it is never a bad thought to forward the charge to the state Committee straight.

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Coverage - Employment

Under the Iowa Civil Rights Act information technology is illegal for whatever "person" to discriminate in employment confronting whatever employee or whatsoever applicant for employment because of the employee or bidder's age, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion or disability. Iowa Code sec. 216.6(1)(a). In using the term "person" the text of the Iowa Human activity differs from Championship VII which uses "employer or amanuensis". Whether this difference ways that supervisors and co-employees are covered is still an open question in Iowa. Other paragraphs cover advertizing by employers and referral agencies, sec. 216.6(1)(c) and bigotry by labor unions. sec. 216.6(i)(b).

The almost unremarkably invoked exception in the Iowa law is for employers who "regularly employ" fewer than four employees. Iowa Code sec. 216.half-dozen(half-dozen)(a). No court has ruled on how part-time and seasonal employees are counted. The federal constabulary is of no help since the federal statutes specifically describe how to figure whether an employee should exist counted.

The other exceptions are:

• The employment of individuals for work within the habitation of the employer if the employer or members of the employer's family reside there during such employment.
• The employment of individuals to return personal service to the person of the employer or members of the employer'south family.
• Qualifications imposed by a bona fide religious institution when such qualifications are related to a bona fide religious purpose.

Iowa Code sec. 216.half-dozen(vi)(b)-(d)

Historic period discrimination confronting those under 18 is not covered. Iowa Code sec. 216.six(three) Also age discrimination in apprentice programs against those over 45 is not covered. Iowa Code sec. 216.6(5).

The Iowa Human action specifically states that a person with aids AIDS or who has tested HIV positive has a protected disability. Iowa Code sec. 216.two(5). (Annotation this is in the definition section and so this protection also extends to areas like housing and accomodations). In keeping with this specific treatment the employment section of the law specifically outlaws the giving of AIDS test every bit a condition of employment. This provision is non necessary with the ADA in result but it does remove any doubt which might ascend at the "postal service-offer" phase. The section also makes illegal any agreement consenting to such a test in commutation for some benefit. AIDS testing is immune under this provision under certain narrow circumstances if land health officials declare that a person working a specific occupation poses a "significant risk" or manual of AIDS. Of grade, even if this is done any pre-offer testing would run afoul of the ADA.

Iowa constabulary has specific protections for pregnant women not found in the federal anti-discrimination laws. Iowa Code sec. 216.6(2). Basically the constabulary prohibits termination of someone because of pregnancy, Iowa Lawmaking sec. 216.six(2)(d), requires treatment of pregnancy similar any other "temporary inability" under an employer's insurance and do good program, Iowa Code sec. 216.six(two)(b) and also requires a minimum viii calendar week get out of abscence if in that location is non sufficient exit provided by the employer's plan. Such a leave is not a motherhood leave, rather, it is for the period for which the employee is disabled by "pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions". Iowa Lawmaking sec. 216.6(2)(e). Information technology is an open upshot whether this provision means that the employer must guarantee a sure level of pay and benefits to an employee disabled by pregnancy. For case, it has non been settled that a woman who needs four weeks to recover from child nascence must exist guaranteed the same pay level or seniority upon her return fifty-fifty if the employer does not make such a guarantee for employees disabled by other conditions.

The only employment regulations of the Iowa Ceremonious Rights Commission which are regularly cited are those pertaining to disability discrimination. The basic requirement of Iowa disability law is that the employer must brand reasonable accommodation, Foods Inc. v. Iowa Ceremonious Rights Commission, 318 North.West.2d 162 (Iowa 1982) , although this has been interpreted to mean that the employer need not incur more than a de minimus cost. Smith v. ADM Feed Co., 456 Northward.Westward.2d 378 (Iowa 1990). Iowa'south inability police is no where near this elementary and one should browse my FTP site for further discussion.

Iowa has as well recognized harassment as a form of discrimination. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers Local No. 238 5. Iowa Ceremonious Rights Commission, 394 North.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1986); Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 North.W.2d 827, 832 (Iowa 1990).

Contents

Coverage - Public Accommodation

Discrimination past "public accomodations" is prohibited by the Iowa Civil Rights Act. A public accomodation is defined every bit "each and every place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods for a fee or charge to nonmembers of any arrangement or association utilizing the place, establishment, or facility". Iowa Code sec. 216.2(12) Linguistically, this is a peculiarly wide definition. The Iowa Committee, for instance, has held than insurance is a public accomodation. This property was affirmed in district court and no further appeal was taken. On the other manus, the Iowa Supreme Courtroom on a v-iv vote has found that membership organizations are non covered by the Act because membership lacks a "spatial attribute." Us Jaycess v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 427 N.W.2nd 450 (Iowa 1988). The real outcome of Jaycees is just how far the ruling should be taken. In 1 reading, the ruling appears to say that unless the service in question is rendered "at a place" which is open up to the public then information technology does not fall within the public adaptation statute. Such a reading would place beyond the Act services such equally whatsoever package commitment services, answering services, paging services, internet providers, credit card companies, catalog orders, subscriptions to publications etc.. Fortunately most of these services would be regulated by federal law. An alternative reading of Jaycees is simply that the Court was belongings that the failure of "membership" per se to look like any other typical service ways information technology was not within the blazon of services which are intended to exist covered. Basically, Jaycees would exist limited to its belongings that membership in organizations is non covered. It is this sort of reading the district court followed in the Prudentialcase when information technology institute that insurance is a public accomodation and rejected the argument that the product must accept the "spatial dimension" discussed in Jaycees.

The statutory exceptions are for individual clubs, Iowa Code sec. 216.2(12), religious institutions acting pursuant to religious doctrine, sec. 216.7(2)(a), and rooming houses for " transient individuals" if the rooming house has less than half dozen rooms and is owner occupied. sec. 216.vii(two)(b)

Ane oddity in the statute is the use of "nonmembers". Formerly this had been "general public" and then "public". This was changed from "pubic" to "nonmembers" in 1984. In 1984 an Iowa congenial arrangement erroneously informed a Blackness human that nether the organization's guidelines he would be barred from the bowling league award ceremony because of his race. The Iowa Legislature reacted. Unfortunately, the draftsmanship was not as good every bit the intentions. As originally drafted the "nonmembers" language appeared only in the private lodge exemption. This exemption provides that if the individual club offers services to nonmembers then it is deemed to be a public accomodation during the catamenia that such nonmembers bask these services. Iowa Code sec. 216.2(12). Thus the fraternal organization would be covered for its bowling awards banquet. Interestingly, private land clubs which permit guests are covered and then long every bit any guests are on the premises. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. 152. Had the nonmembers language stayed put in the private club exception all would make total sense. Unfortunately in drafting this language got a wunderlust and concluded up replacing "public" wherever it occured. Thus to be covered in the first identify a business must offering services to "nonmembers" of any organization or association utilizing the place, establishment, or facility. Merely what if its just a soda fountain and there is no membership organisation utilizing the place? Is it always covered under the theory that anyone is a "nonmember" of a non-real arrangement or is it never covered because if no i is a member and then no i tin can be dubbed a"non-fellow member"? In calorie-free of such an ambiguity some guidance tin be gained from the generally very wide language used and the caption which accompanied the "nonmembers" bill. In the neb'due south explanation section it states that the amendment "expands the definition of public accommodation." 1984 Study Nib 782. Information technology seems best to read "nonmembers" in the coverage portion of the subsection to be at least as broad equally "public".

Whatever this definition might mean otherwise it is clear that public bodies are covered. The definition specifically "includes each state and local government unit or revenue enhancement-supported district of whatever kind, nature, or form that offers services, facilities, benefits, grants or goods to the public". Iowa Code sec. 216.2(12). In a 1982 stance the Chaser General of Iowa stated that prisons are not covered equally "public accommodations" since they do not "offering services" to the public. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. May 24, 1982. Apparently the thought of "offering" a "service" implies that the person has a pick. A prisoner does non. Also prisons are not "offered" to the "public" but rather only to those people bedevilled of crimes.

The people who may non discriminate are the "possessor, lessee, sublessee, proprietor, director, or superintendent of any public accommodation" and even more broadly "whatever amanuensis or employee" of whoever is running the public accommodation. Iowa Code sec. 216.7. And then both the bar owner and a bar tender, for case, could be liable for refusal to serve someone considering of their race. Finally, discrimination based on the post-obit factors is illegal: race, creed, color, sex, national origin, faith or disability. sec. 216.7. Annotation that age is not listed and that historic period-based discrimination at public accomodation is legal.

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Coverage - Housing

There are non as many coverage issues for housing every bit the other two. The statute states that discrimination by a "person" is covered but then goes on to list several specifics anyway including owners, brokers, attorneys, auctioneers, and agents. Iowa Code sec. 216.8. The discrimination which is covered includes:

• Refusal to sell Iowa Code sec. 216.8(1)
• Unwise make unavailable real property. Iowa Lawmaking sec. 216.viii(1)
• Discrimination in the terms, weather or privileges of the sale or rental Iowa Codesec. 216.8(2)
• Discriminatory ad Iowa Code sec. 216.eight(iii)
• Blockbusting Iowa Code sec. 218.8A(1) (basically this means trying to scare people into selling by proverb that the racial characteristics of the neighborhood are changing).
• Indicating that property is not available when it is. Iowa Code sec. 218.8A(2)
• Failing to brand reasonable accommodation for those with a inability. Iowa Code sec. 218.8A(3)
• Threats or interference with housing rights Iowa Code sec. 216.11A

A special note needs to be fabricated on reasonable accomodation. The tenant can request to alter the premises but they must be willing to pay for the alterations. Also the tenant must be willing to pay to restore the unit to its original status if the alteration is one non probable to be needed by anyone else and which might interfere with a subsequent tenant's use. Reasonable accommodation must also be made in rules. For case, a no pets rule must be altered for assistive animals such as guide dogs. Iowa Code sec. 216.8A(3).

Discrimination based on the following factors is illegal: race, color, creed, sex, religion, national origin, disability, or familial condition . sec. 216.8. Note that age is non listed and that age-based discrimination at public accomodation is legal.Age is not a covered basis of discrimination in housing. This means a landlord may discriminate based on historic period. But a landlord may not discriminate against households with children in them. A "no kids" policy is patently illegal unless the landlord falls within the elderly housing exemption. Iowa Code sec. 216.12(4).

Finally, the Iowa Civil Rights Deed has different exemptions than Title VIII. Generally, the coverage of the Iowa statute is broader. Broader coverage likewise results from the fact that in Iowa discrimination with respect to "real holding" is covered while under federal law only discrimnation regarding "dwellings" is covered. The Iowa statute covers commercial property and not just living infinite.

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Correct to Sue

After a complaint has been on file for 60 days the complainant may asking a correct-to-sue letter from the Commission. Iowa Code sec. 216.16(1)(b); 161 IAC iii.10(4). The Iowa Civil Rights Human action pre-empts other causes of action and thus if you intend to sue on a case which requires proof of discrimination equally 1 of its elements y'all must file a charge with the Committee and obtain a right-to-sue letter. East.m. Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.Westward.second 36, 38 (Iowa 1993). A right-to-sue may not issue if:

1. A finding of "no likely crusade" has been made; or
2. The example has been "administratively closed" and two years have elapsed; or
3. A conciliation agreement has been agreed to; or
4. The Committee has served notice scheduling public hearing on the case; or
5. The Commission has constitute "no jurisdiction" or "not timely" on the case.

Iowa Code sec. 216.16; 161 IAC iii.10(4) One time a right-to-sue is issued the Complainant has xc days from the date of mailing, to file an activity in district court. Saemisch v. Ley Motors, 387 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa 1986)(runs from date of mailing); Iowa Code sec 216.16(iii)(90 days from engagement RTS is "issued"); 161 IAC ii.i(6)("consequence" a RTS means to post information technology by certified post) The activity should be filed either in the county where the discriminatory act occured or where the Respondent has its principle place of business. Iowa Code sec. 216.16

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Affirmative Relief, Damages and Attorney's Fees

At the outset it should be noted that I will hash out the remedial dominance of the Commission and the commune courts interchangably. This is because by statute the commune courtroom hearing a right-to-sue can grant whatever relief which the Commission tin, Iowa Code sec. 216.16(5); and by judicial interpretation the district court can award no more than forms of relief than the Commission. Smith v. ADM Feed Co., 456 N.Westward.2d 378, 381 (Iowa 1990). Thus their authority to grant relief is identical.

Affirmative Relief

Throughout its history the Commission has been authorized by statute, Iowa Code sec. 216.15(8)(a), to honor relief directed at modifying the acquit of the Respondent. If discrimination is found the Committee must enter a end and desist guild and tin order farther affirmative relief such as:

• Hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees
• Admission or restoration of individuals to a labor system
• Admission to or participation in an apprenticeship training plan or other on-the-job grooming program
• Access of individuals to a public accommodation or an educational institution.
• Sale, exchange, lease, rental, assignment or sublease of real property to an individual.
• Extension to all individuals of the full and equal enjoyment of the advantages, facilities, privileges, and services of the respondent denied to the complainant considering of the discriminatory or unfair exercise.
• Reporting every bit to the way of compliance.
• Posting notices in conspicuous places in the respondent'due south place of business

In the first case in which the Iowa Courtroom reviewed a Commission club the Courtroom remarked that the Civil Rights Human activity must be interpreted not as merely providing a remedy in a specific dispute but rather as correcting a broader pattern of behavoir. Iron Workers Local No. 67 5. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758, 770 (Iowa 1971). In attacking this broader target "[a]north appropriate remedial order should close off 'untraveled roads' to the illicit end not 'just the worn one'." Id. at 171.

Back Pay

Backpay awards accept always been authorized by the Iowa Human activity. Iowa Lawmaking sec. 216.xv(8)(a)(1) The statute expressly provides that the amount of back pay shall exist reduced by the amount of interim earned income and unemployment compensation. Id. The ultimate goal of a backpay award " is to place the injured party in the same position every bit he or she would have been had at that place been no injuries." Foods Inc. five. Iowa Civil Rights Committee, 318 N.W.2d 162, 171 (Iowa 1982); accord, Hy-Vee 5. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 453 N.W.second 512, 531 (Iowa 1990). The Hy Vee case repeated the additional principles that "In computing awards in discrimination cases . . . an unrealistic exactitude is not required [and that] uncertainties in determining what an employee would accept earned before the bigotry should be resolved against the employer." Hy-Vee, at 530-31. In Foods the Court refused to deduct from a backpay award the complainant's farm income since this income would have been earned even had the complainant kept working for the store. Foods at 171. In both Foods and Hy Vee the Iowa Supreme Courtroom approved awards of front pay to compensate the complainant for projected loss of wages in the future.Foods at 171; Hy-Vee, at 532.

Actual Damages - emotional distress

Actual damages other than backpay, including damages for emotional distress, are also available under the Iowa Act. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers Local No. 238 5. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 394 North.W.2d 375, 383 (Iowa 1986). "In computing awards in discrimination cases . . . an unrealistic exactitude is not required." Hy-Vee v. Iowa Civil Rights Committee, 453 N.W.2d 512, 525 (Iowa 1990); Hamer five. Iowa Ceremonious Rights Committee, 472 N.Due west.second 259, 265 (Iowa 1991). "Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused with right of recovery." Hy-Vee, 453 N.W.2nd at 525. The decision of how much distress damages to award is, of necessity, a discretionary decision of the fact finder. E.g. Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 836 (Iowa 1990); Northrup 5. Miles Homes, Inc. of Iowa, 204 N.W.2d 850, 860 (Iowa 1973)("Placing a dollar corporeality on [mental pain and anguish] is specially a function of the jury"). The adequacy of the award in a detail example depends on the unique facts of that instance. Lynch 5. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 836 (Iowa 1990). Thus prior awards are not particularly helpful. E.g. Id.; Householder v. Town of Clayton, 221 N.W.2d 488 (Iowa 1974); Northrup v. Miles Holmes, Inc. 204 N.W.2d 850, 861 (Iowa 1973). "[A] civil rights complainant may recover compensable damages for emotional distress without a showing of physical injury, severe distress, or outrageous conduct." Hy-Vee v. Iowa Ceremonious Rights Commission,453 Northward.W.2d 512, 526 (Iowa 1990); Lynch five. Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 835 (Iowa 1990); Hamer 5. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 472 Northward.W.2d 259, 266 (Iowa 1991).

Based on persuasive precedent Iowa would virtually certainly hold that medical testimony is not required in social club to accolade damages for emotional distress. Indeed in the contempo case of City of Hampton 5. Iowa Ceremonious Rights Committee, 554 North.Due west.second 532 (Iowa 1996) the Courtroom reduced an emotional distress impairment award because of the lack of medical testimony. Yet the Courtroom nonetheless did observe that $20,000 was a justified honor and then appears to have constitute that medical testimony may touch on the amount of the award but does non preclude an honor. For the proposition that medical testimony is not required See Franklin Publishing Co. v. Massachusets Commission Against Discrimination, 519 N.East.2nd 798, 49 BNA FEP 1251, 1252 (Mass. 1988); accord Brunson v. East&L Transportation Co., 441 N.West.2d 48, 56 BNA FEP 1587 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Reithmiller v. Blue Cross Inkling Shield, 390 Northward.W.2d 227, 233- 34 (Mich. App. 1986); c.f. east.g. Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 454 N.W.2d 405, 54 BNA FEP 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (distress amercement awarded although no skilful testimony); Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 56 BNA FEP 1491 (6th Cir. 1990) (same). The "plaintiff'due south own testimony may be solely sufficient to institute humiliation or emotional distress." EEOC Policy Guide On Compensatory and Punitive Damages Under The 1991 Ceremonious Rights Deed, II. (A)(two) (July 7, 1992) (quoting Williams five. TWA, 660 F.2d 1267, 27 BNA FEP Cases 487 (8th Cir. 1981)); accord Stallworth five. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 39 BNA FEP Cases 983 (11th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Anchor Building, Corp., 536 F.second 231, 236 (8th Cir. 1976); Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.second 462 (7th Cir. 1977); Thoreson v. Penthouse International, 563 N.Y.Due south.2d 968, 59 BNA FEP Cases 1085, 1088 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670, 677 (Minn.App. 1991). Indeed, emotional distress tin be inferred from the circumstances. Seaton 5. Heaven Realty, 491 F.second 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, 648 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1980); Blessum five. Howard County Board Of Supervisors, 295 Due north.W.2d 836, 845 (Iowa 1980); Dickerson v. Young, 332 N.W.2d 93, 98-99 (Iowa 1983).

Where an individual has an existing emotional trauma or injury at the time of the discrimination the honor is governed by the "eggshell skull" doctrine familiar from general tort law. Under this doctrine a wrongdoer takes the person he injures as he finds him. McBoom v. Land, 226 N.W.second 41, 45 (Iowa 1975). This principle applies to psychological and emotional injuries. McBoom v. Land, 226 N.Westward.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 1975). Thus if the victim is predisposed to endure the type of distress inflicted or to suffer a more than the usual amount of distress and then the wrongdoer is nevertheless liable for the unabridged amount of that distress. McBoom five. State, 226 N.W.2d 41, 45-46 (Iowa 1975) (prisoner's mental vulnerability as a result of his imprisonment was admissible to bear witness emotional trauma suffered at loss of hand); accordance EEOC Policy Guide On Compensatory and Punitive Damages Nether The 1991 Civil Rights Act, II. (A)(2) (July 7, 1992) ("The fact that the complaining party may be unusually emotionally sensitive and incur great emotional harm from discriminatory conduct volition not absolve the respondent from responsibility for the greater emotional harm."); Williamson v. Handy Button Machine Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Perhaps [plaintiff] was unusually sensitive, merely a tortfeasor takes its victims as it finds them"); Alston five. Blue Cross, 37 BNA FEP 1792, 1798 (Due east.D.Northward.Y. 1985)("accused must have plaintiff as information technology finds her"); Chocolate-brown v. Boston Academy, 674 F.Supp. 393, 46 BNA FEP 1642, 1644 (D.C. Mass. 1987) ("a defendant takes the plaintiff equally she is, and takes the risk that she may be unusually susceptible to particular sorts of harm").

Attorney Fees

A prevailing ceremonious rights plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees. "The reason for awarding attorney fees in [a civil rights] case is to ensure that private citizens can afford to pursue the legal actions necessary to advance the public interest vindicated past the policies of ceremonious rights acts." Ayala v. Centerline Inc., 415 N.W.2d 603, 605 (Iowa 1987). Interestingly in Iowa the laurels of fees is a i fashion provision. The provision authorizing fees is in the list of remedies that the Committee might gild if it finds discrimination. Specifically the act states that the Committee may order:

Payment to the complainant of damages for an injury caused by the discriminatory or unfair practice which damages shall include but are non limited to actual amercement, court costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Iowa Code sec. 216.15(8)(a)(8). Manifestly the Commission is not authorized under this provision to award fees to a prevailing respondent under any circumstances. On a right to sue letter the district courtroom is given the additional authority to award fees to a respondent if the action is frivolous. Iowa Code sec. 216.16(5).

Calculation of fees is done on the familiar "lodestar" method by which the corporeality of reasonable hourly charge per unit is multiplied by the number of hours reasonably expended. East.k. Landals five. George A. Rolfes Co., 454 N.W.2d 891, 897 (Iowa 1990); Dutcher v. Randal Foods, 546 N.Westward.2d 889, 896 (Iowa 1996). The hourly rate is based on the prevailing market charge per unit in the relevant community. Dutcher at 896. An evidentiary hearing is required earlier an award of fees is fabricated, Ayala at 606, and the court is required to make detailed findings with regard to fee honour factors. Dutcher at 897.

A plaintiff who prevails on an appeal is entitled to fees for the appeal as well every bit for the trial. Ayala at 606. The fee proceedings are separate and distinct from the underlying trial and an appeal on the merits does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to honour fees. Landals v. George A. Rolfes Co., 454 N.W.2d 891, 898 (Iowa 1990). A post-judgement move under rule 179 (seeking to expand findings of fact) should be construed as an application for fees and a fee application is non subject to the 10 day limitation of a 179(b) move. Metropolis of Hampton v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, (September 18, 1996). The prevailing plaintiff is also entitled to fees expended in the course of the fee hearing.Lynch v. Des Moines,, 464 N.W.second 236, 240 (Iowa 1990). Also a plaintiff may recover fees for legal work performed even prior to the filing of a charge of discrimination. Davis five. City of Waterloo, 551 N.W.2d 876, 886 (Iowa 1996). A contingency fee arrangement does not set a maximuum limit on the allowance of fees. Landalsat 898 (Iowa 1990). The fact that the fee award may greatly exceed the amercement obtained does not by itself justify a reduction of the fee award. Lynch v. Des Moines,, 464 Due north.W.2d 236, 238-39 (Iowa 1990). Recovering less than a settlement offer likewise does not limit the fee accolade. Dutcher at 895. Commonly law clerk and paralegal fees should be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff. Landals v. George A. Rolfes Co., 454 N.Westward.2d 891, 898 (Iowa 1990); Edson v. Chambers, 519 N.W.2nd 832, 834 (Iowa App. 1994). Awards for travel, photocopying, phone, and investigative expenses are allowable just whether or not they are to exist awarded are within the district court'south discretion. Edson at 834.

More than generally, the principles governing fee awards under the Iowa Act are identical to those governing federal fee awards. Dutcher at 897.

Punitive Damages

Except in housing cases punitive damages are not bachelor under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers Local No. 238 5. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 394 Due north.W.2nd 375, 384 (Iowa 1986)(Commission has no potency to award punitives); Smith v. ADM Feed Co., 456 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Iowa 1990)(On a right-to-sue the district court sits as the Commission and can only honor damages the Commission can) . In a housing case punitive amercement are bachelor in court, Iowa Code sec. 216.17A(6), and a fine is available before the Commission. sec. 216.15A(xi)(b)

Contents

Jury Trial

Except where housing discrimination is alleged, there is no jury trial in state court nether the Iowa Ceremonious Rights human activity. Smith v. ADM Feed Co., 456 N.W.second 378, 381, 384 (Iowa 1990). The court has not really ruled on housing bigotry but the lynchpin of its ruling in ADM was that the district courts "sit equally the commission" because they hear cases via a correct to sue letter. There is no right to sue in housing discrimination and besides information technology is admittedly clear that a "directly activity" is on the same ground as any other civil action in court since a directly activeness can be maintained even if no charge is filed.

There may well be a jury trial on all Iowa Civil Rights Act claims when they are heard via supplement jurisdiction in federal court. In such a circumstance federal law, not state police, governs whether a jury trial is avialable even on the state ceremonious rights claim. I accept set out elsewhere the argument supporting such a jury trial in federal court.

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